Assessing India's AI-Driven Satellite Intelligence to Monitor Anomaly Detection in Indonesia's North Natuna Sea

Introduction  

The North Natuna Sea represents a critical maritime zone where Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which intersects with disputed territorial claims in the broader South China Sea zone. The bone of contention is situated to the north of the Natuna Islands and stretching toward the southern waters of Vietnam, comprising 83,000 square kilometres. This zone also holds vast hydrocarbon deposits, including about 46 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of recoverable natural gas, which is one of the largest reserves in Asia and sustains rich fisheries yielding roughly 504,000 tons each year (Irawan & Carnegie, 2025, p. 3). The strategic importance of these waters extends beyond economic value; they serve as a major international shipping corridor connecting East Asian economies with the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait.

Despite Indonesia's consistent position as a non-claimant state in South China Sea territorial disputes, there has still been an overlap between Indonesia's EEZ and China's expansive nine-dash line and it has also generated recurring incidents involving Chinese fishing vessels, coast guard ships, and naval platforms entering waters Jakarta considers sovereign Indonesian territory. Since 2010, these intrusions have escalated, with Chinese vessels frequently conducting fishing operations under coast guard escort, effectively asserting Beijing's historical claims based on traditional fishing grounds (Irawan & Carnegie, 2025, p. 5). In 2017, the Indonesian government renamed these waters the North Natuna Sea as a symbolic re-assertion of sovereignty, yet the move has done little to curb continued Chinese incursions. Amid these growing maritime contestation, advanced satellite-based surveillance has become indispensable for monitoring large oceanic zones where conventional surface patrols remain both inadequate and extremely costly. India’s progress in developing AI-enabled satellite intelligence, under the Space-Based Surveillance Phase III initiative, presents potential avenues for bilateral collaboration with Indonesia and other regional actors experiencing similar maritime security challenges. This research article explores these technical capacities of India’s evolving satellite constellation, evaluates its utility in detecting maritime anomalies within contested waters, and considers the broader strategic implications for India-Indonesia defence cooperation in the maritime sphere.

India's Space-Based Surveillance Architecture  

The SBS Phase III Program:

India's Space-Based Surveillance program has evolved through multiple phases since its inception in the early 2000s. The SBS-I constellation, initiated with Technology Experiment Satellite (TES) in 2001, achieved one-meter resolution imagery, which was sufficient for monitoring adversary military installations along contested borders. The subsequent SBS-II phase, launched in 2013, incorporated six satellites including the Cartosat-2 series and RISAT-2 synthetic aperture radar platforms capable of all-weather, day-night surveillance (India's New Space-Based Spy Network, 2025, p. 2).

More recently, the SBS Phase III program, allocated $3.2 billion over the next decade, planning for a deployment of 52 satellites with multiple orbital configurations from geostationary equatorial orbit (GEO) at 36,000 kilometers to low Earth orbit (LEO) platforms. ISRO Chairman S. Somnath articulated the program's scope in December 2023, emphasizing its inter-satellite communication capabilities and coordinated surveillance: If a satellite in GEO at 36,000 km detects activity, it can task another satellite in a lower orbit to take a closer look and gather more information (Satellites Will Talk, 2025, p. 1). The initial batch of 21 satellites will be manufactured by ISRO, while the remaining 31 will be produced by private sector partners including Tata Advanced Systems Ltd, marking India's first major public-private partnership in classified satellite programs.

AI-Powered Onboard Processing:

The most important feature of SBS-III satellites is their integration of artificial intelligence processors which would enable autonomous onboard data analysis. Instead of transmitting vast quantities of raw imagery to ground stations for human analyst review, AI algorithms perform real-time threat detection, track identification markers, and target orbit classification. Expert Somnath described this capability, very critical for managing data volume, quoting: Greater integration of AI and data-driven methodologies to analyze data, minimize data downloads, and extract only essential information (India Will Launch 50 AI-Powered Spy Satellites, 2025, p. 1).

This onboard processing technology employs both convolutional neural networks (CNNs) trained on extensive datasets of maritime vessels, military platforms, and also for other critical infrastructures. The AI systems perform multiple simultaneous functions, such as object detection, identifying vessel presence, classification & determining ship types and sizes, change its detection after comparing the temporal imagery to identify new activities or movement patterns, and anomaly flagging whenever observed activity seems to deviate from expected baselines. Therefore, by filtering irrelevant data and transmitting only actionable intelligence, the satellite reduces additional bandwidth requirements and accelerates the intelligence cycle from detection to quicker operation.

Multi-Sensor Integration:

The SBS-III constellation also integrates various sensor technologies by optimizing them for different maritime surveillance requirements. For example, Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems, which are already operational on RISAT-2 and RISAT-2A satellites, could penetrate cloud cover and operate in darkness, providing a consistent all-weather monitoring critical for tropical maritime environments, where cloud coverage often exceeds 60% (Ranith et al., 2024, p. 7). Similarly, Electro-optical (EO) sensors capture high-resolution visual imagery enabling detailed vessel identification, while thermal infrared sensors could detect heat signatures from engines and exhaust systems.

In addition, advanced AI models capable of fusing multiple data from these complementary sensors, could be used as cross-referencing detections to further improve accuracy and reduce false positives. For instance, a SAR detection of a vessel-sized radar return can be confirmed through EO imagery identifying visible ship characteristics, while thermal signatures verify active propulsion systems. This multi-sensor fusion approach, (similar to methodologies demonstrated by the European Space Agency's Mission), can significantly enhance detection reliability compared to single-sensor systems (New Satellite to Show How AI Advances Earth Observation, 2024, p. 2).

Maritime Anomaly Detection Capabilities

Detecting Dark Vessels:

A primary challenge in maritime surveillance is tracking vessels that may disable or manipulate their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders to avoid detection, commonly known as the "dark vessels". While international maritime regulations mandates all vessels over 300 gross tons to broadcast their AIS signals, these cooperative systems can be easily deactivated or spoofed by operators who might be engaged in illegal activities. Research experts across marine protected areas globally found that AIS data alone missed approximately 90% of fishing vessel detections compared to satellite-based synthetic aperture radar surveillance (Raynor et al., 2025, p. 4). In Southeast Asian waters, where AIS compliance and signal reception are particularly problematic, this blind spot proves especially significant.

India's SAR-equipped satellites can overcome this limitation by detecting vessels through radar systems regardless of their individual transponder status. The SAR systems can also transmit microwave pulses toward the ocean surface and analyze reflected signals, with vessel-sized metallic objects producing distinctive radar signatures. Similarly, Machine learning algorithms trained with extensive SAR imagery datasets can automatically identify these signatures, they can classify vessel sizes and types, and track movement patterns over a brief time. Thus, when this is combined with AIS data, their combined capability enables identification of vessels whose broadcast positions don't match satellite-observed locations, revealing a strong indicator of transponder manipulation or spoofing (Dark Vessel Detection Technology, 2025, p. 3).

Behavioural Pattern Analysis:

Beyond simple vessel detection, AI-enabled satellite systems are also capable of analyzing behavioral patterns to identify activities requiring investigation. Machine learning models could mimic certain sequences of vessel positions to identify their movement patterns and maritime activities. Fishing vessels sometimes can display a distinctive loitering behavior in strategic areas. It is speculated that cargo ships follow more linear transit routes between ports, whereas vessels conducting at-sea transfers, could be potentially involve illegal transshipment and they could be identified by their characteristic parallel course and speed matching (Remote Sensing Intelligence, 2025, p. 5).

Usually, anomaly detection algorithms flag vessels whose observed behavior might deviate significantly from expected patterns than their vessel type and declared purpose. For example, a vessel broadcasting a cargo ship MMSI number but displaying extended loitering consistent with fishing operations would trigger an anomaly alert. Similarly, repeated presence of foreign-flagged fishing vessels within Indonesia's EEZ, particularly when escorted by coast guard or naval platforms, generates alerts for maritime enforcement authorities. These AI-generated risk assessments enable coast guard and naval assets to prioritize patrol and interdiction efforts toward highest-probability violations rather than conducting random patrols across vast oceanic areas.

Environmental and Infrastructure Monitoring:

AI satellite systems also provide capabilities extending beyond vessel tracking to broader maritime domain awareness. Algorithms for identifying change detection, comparing satellite imagery across different time intervals, and can reveal the emergence of artificial islands, port infrastructure, or military installations or other developments of particular security concern in the contested South China Sea, where China has infamously built extensive facilities on reclaimed land. Meanwhile, machine learning models trained on marine ecosystem parameters are capable of identifying anomalies such as oil slicks from vessel discharges or accidents, harmful algal blooms, and sediment plumes generated by dredging activities. (Razzano et al., 2024, p. 3). 

These environmental monitoring capabilities serve dual civilian-military purposes. While supporting conservation efforts and disaster response, they also provide early warning of activities potentially affecting Indonesia's maritime claims or environmental security. For instance, detection of extensive dredging operations could indicate preparation for installation of military infrastructure, while monitoring of fish stock distributions and illegal fishing patterns informs enforcement priorities and fisheries management decisions.

Application to North Natuna Sea Monitoring  

India’s SBS-III constellation uses a multi-orbit architecture that enables persistent monitoring of hidden security events in the North Natuna Sea. India’s Geostationary satellites positioned over the Indian Ocean–Southeast Asia region provide a continuous coverage of fixed geographic areas, at a comparatively lower spatial resolution than low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites. By contrast, LEO satellites in sun-synchronous orbits deliver higher-resolution imagery with regular revisit cycles, facilitating detailed vessel identification and activity analysis. Once they are fully deployed, all the 52-satellite constellations are expected to achieve revisit intervals of only a few hours or less across priority maritime zones, in the Natuna Region.

This persistent coverage directly addresses Indonesia’s longstanding challenge of monitoring its extensive maritime domain with limited surface and aerial patrol assets. As the Indonesian Navy is tasked with overseeing the world’s largest archipelagic waters and adjacent exclusive economic zones (EEZs) totaling more than 6 million square kilometers, Indonesia’s navy and coast guard face immense operational demands. The North Natuna Sea alone encompasses roughly 83,000 square kilometers, where Indonesia’s EEZ overlaps by 30 percent with China’s contested nine-dash line claim, creating acute enforcement difficulties. Satellite-based surveillance offers Indonesian authorities the ability to continuously detect incursions and violations across this entire area, allowing scarce patrol vessels to be deployed selectively to locations flagged by satellite intelligence as sites of illegal activity (Qurbani et al., 2024, p. 8).

Illegal Fishing Detection:

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing represents a primary maritime security concern in the North Natuna Sea, with Chinese fishing fleets conducting regular operations that Indonesia considers violations of its EEZ rights. Global Fishing Watch analysis from the AIS and SAR data has demonstrated that satellite-based monitoring with AI analysis can detect approximately 75% of fishing vessels that would otherwise remain invisible to AIS-only systems (Using AI and Satellites to Track Illegal Fishing, 2024, p. 2). Application of these techniques to North Natuna waters would substantially enhance Indonesia's ability to identify and document violations.

Similarly, India's satellite constellation could provide Indonesia with near-real-time alerts when fishing vessels, particularly those flagged to foreign nations, operate within the North Natuna EEZ. Machine learning algorithms analyze vessel movement patterns to distinguish fishing activity (identified with low speeds, circular or zigzag patterns, and extended loitering) from transit voyages. Detection of Chinese coast guard vessels escorting Indonesian fishing fleets, is a recurring pattern in the North Natuna incident. It triggers high-priority alerts among Indonesian authorities on sovereignty violations. Over time, consistent satellite monitoring may exert a deterrent effect, as research on marine protected areas has shown that known satellite surveillance substantially reduces illegal fishing activity (Raynor et al., 2025, p. 6).

Naval and Coast Guard Activity Monitoring:

Beyond monitoring fishing vessels, comprehensive maritime domain awareness requires the ability to track naval and coast guard platforms whose presence in contested waters carries significant sovereignty implications. The SBS-III constellation’s multi-sensor architecture enables detection and classification of larger military vessels through synthetic aperture radar (SAR) signatures, electro-optical imagery that reveals hull configurations and weapons systems, and long-term tracking of surface combatant movements. When Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyers or Coast Guard cutters enter Indonesia’s EEZ, as exemplified by the destroyer Kunming (172) in September 2021, satellite surveillance provides Indonesian authorities with timely situational awareness and documentary evidence of such incursions.

Systematic monitoring of naval activity patterns generates strategic intelligence on adversary operating procedures, patrol frequencies, and response timelines. This analysis informs Indonesian defense planning by guiding the optimal deployment of naval assets, tailoring response protocols to different categories of incursions, and supporting escalation management strategies. Moreover, the ability to document foreign military presence through satellite imagery offers Indonesia valuable diplomatic leverage, serving as credible evidence in bilateral negotiations and regional forums addressing maritime sovereignty disputes.

India-Indonesia defence Cooperation Framework  

India and Indonesia have progressively deepened defence cooperation since upgrading bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2018. The 3rd India-Indonesia Defence Ministers' Dialogue in November 2025 emphasized maritime security coordination and defence technology collaboration as priority areas. Defence Ministers Rajnath Singh and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin agreed to intensify cooperation in maritime domain awareness, cyber resilience and joint operational readiness (India, Indonesia Agree to Deepen Defence Cooperation, 2025, p. 1). Indonesia specifically acknowledged India's submarine development expertise and expressed interest in establishing a Joint Defence Industry Cooperation Committee to facilitate technology transfer and supply-chain integration.

Maritime security cooperation finds operational expression through joint naval exercises including Samudra Shakti and the multilateral MILAN series. These exercises enhance interoperability between Indian and Indonesian naval forces while demonstrating commitment to rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific. Both nations emphasize strong convergence between the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, providing conceptual alignment for cooperation on maritime challenges including freedom of navigation and resource security (India, Indonesia Decide to Expand Defence, 2026, p. 1).

Information Sharing Mechanisms:

Effective utilization of India's satellite intelligence capabilities for Indonesian maritime security requires establishment of appropriate information-sharing arrangements. India operates the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram, which coordinates maritime domain awareness across regional partners through real-time vessel tracking data fusion and threat information sharing. Indonesia participates as an IFC-IOR partner nation, receiving regular updates on maritime activity in the broader Indian Ocean region. Expansion of this cooperation to include systematic sharing of satellite-derived intelligence on North Natuna Sea activities would represent a natural extension of existing mechanisms.

Operational information sharing would likely follow a tiered approach balancing intelligence value with security classification concerns. Routine automated alerts on vessel detections and movements could flow through existing secure communication channels, while higher-resolution imagery and detailed pattern analysis might require more controlled dissemination protocols. Both nations maintain professional military-to-military relationships and participate in multilateral intelligence-sharing forums, providing proven frameworks adaptable to satellite intelligence cooperation. The key technical requirement involves ensuring Indonesian maritime operations centers can receive, process, and integrate satellite-derived intelligence into their existing surveillance pictures alongside inputs from national patrol aircraft, surface vessels, and shore-based radar systems.

Strategic Unity among India and Indonesia:

India and Indonesia share fundamental strategic interests in maintaining maritime security and resisting unilateral attempts to alter the status quo through coercion. Both nations have experienced Chinese maritime assertiveness, India along the disputed Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean, Indonesia in the North Natuna Sea EEZ overlap. While Indonesia maintains a non-aligned posture and seeks economic cooperation with China, Jakarta's willingness to redesignate the North Natuna Sea and strengthen military presence in the area demonstrates commitment to defending sovereign maritime rights (Irawan & Carnegie, 2025, p. 12).

Enhanced satellite intelligence cooperation serves both nations' interests without requiring Indonesia to formally align with India against China. Indonesia gains access to advanced surveillance capabilities it cannot yet develop independently, enabling more effective monitoring and enforcement in contested waters. India strengthens regional partnerships supporting its broader Indo-Pacific strategy while positioning Indian space technology as a preferred alternative to Chinese systems for Southeast Asian partners. The arrangement exemplifies practical security cooperation based on shared interests rather than formal alliance structures, consistent with both nations' strategic cultures emphasizing autonomy and non-alignment.

Challenges and Limitations

Technical Constraints:

Despite significant capabilities, satellite-based maritime surveillance faces inherent technical limitations. SAR systems, while operating in all weather, struggle to detect small fishing vessels under approximately 15 meters length, potentially missing significant illegal fishing activity conducted by smaller craft. Revisit intervals measured in hours rather than minutes mean that fast-moving vessels can alter positions substantially between satellite passes, complicating continuous tracking. Cloud coverage, though penetrable by SAR, still degrades electro-optical imagery quality in tropical maritime environments (Siddique, 2024, p. 4).

AI algorithm performance depends critically on training data quality and representativeness. Models trained primarily on vessel signatures from other ocean regions may exhibit reduced accuracy when applied to Southeast Asian maritime environments with different vessel types, fishing methods, and oceanographic conditions. Adversaries aware of satellite monitoring can employ countermeasures including timed operations during gaps in coverage, use of small boats below detection thresholds, and deliberate AIS spoofing designed to confuse correlation algorithms. Continuous model retraining with regional data and adversarial examples proves essential but resource-intensive.

Political Sensitivities:

Indonesia's foreign policy balances multiple relationships and avoids actions that could be perceived as joining containment coalitions against China. Overt intelligence cooperation with India on monitoring Chinese maritime activities could provoke Beijing's displeasure and potentially jeopardize Indonesia's substantial economic relationship with China, including Belt and Road Initiative investments and trade flows. President Prabowo Subianto's administration, like his predecessor Jokowi Widodo, seeks to maximize Indonesia's strategic autonomy by maintaining productive relations with all major powers rather than choosing sides (Irawan & Carnegie, 2025, p. 15).

Public disclosure of satellite intelligence cooperation could generate domestic political complications in both countries. Indonesian nationalist constituencies might view reliance on foreign intelligence capabilities as undermining sovereignty rather than supporting it. In India, strategic analysts might question resource allocation toward monitoring Southeast Asian waters when primary security concerns focus on China and Pakistan along land borders. Successful cooperation therefore likely requires discrete implementation emphasizing technical maritime domain awareness enhancement rather than highlighting any anti-China orientation.

Implementation Requirements:

Effective satellite intelligence utilization requires Indonesia to develop complementary capabilities beyond simply receiving intelligence products. Indonesian maritime operations centers need personnel trained to interpret satellite imagery, evaluate AI-generated alerts for accuracy, and integrate satellite-derived intelligence with other information sources. Investment in secure communications infrastructure, data processing systems, and analyst workstations proves necessary. Perhaps most importantly, Indonesia must maintain sufficient surface and air patrol assets to respond to satellite-detected violations; intelligence value diminishes significantly if detected illegal activities cannot generate enforcement responses due to asset unavailability.

Conclusion

India's development of AI-enabled satellite intelligence capabilities through the Space-Based Surveillance Phase III program represents a significant advancement in regional maritime domain awareness technology. The constellation's integration of synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical sensors, and machine learning algorithms provides capabilities specifically relevant to Indonesia's maritime security challenges in the North Natuna Sea. Detection of dark vessels, behavioral anomaly identification, and persistent monitoring of contested waters address critical gaps in Indonesia's current surveillance architecture. 

The strategic logic favoring India-Indonesia cooperation on satellite intelligence appears compelling. Both nations face maritime sovereignty challenges involving assertive Chinese activities, both emphasize rules-based maritime order and freedom of navigation, and both seek to enhance indigenous defence capabilities while maintaining strategic autonomy. India's satellite technology offers Indonesia access to advanced capabilities supporting maritime enforcement without dependence on major power alliance commitments. For India, supporting Indonesian maritime security strengthens regional partnerships aligned with broader Indo-Pacific strategy objectives.

However, successful implementation requires navigating technical limitations, political sensitivities, and capability development requirements. Satellite surveillance complements rather than replaces surface and air patrol assets; Indonesia must maintain sufficient enforcement capabilities to act on intelligence. Discrete implementation avoiding public emphasis on anti-China orientations helps manage Beijing's potential objections while preserving Indonesia's valued strategic autonomy. Technical capacity building in imagery analysis, secure communications, and intelligence fusion proves essential for effective intelligence utilization.

As maritime security challenges intensify across the Indo-Pacific and space-based intelligence capabilities proliferate, India's satellite systems positioned as alternatives to Chinese or Western options may attract increasing interest from Southeast Asian partners seeking enhanced maritime domain awareness. The North Natuna Sea, where sovereignty contestation, resource competition, and illegal fishing converge in a relatively compact geographic area, provides an ideal test case for applying advanced satellite intelligence to regional maritime security challenges. Success in this application could establish templates for broader India-ASEAN space cooperation supporting collective maritime security interests across the broader Indo-Pacific region.

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The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of CNAWS.

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